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ABSTRACT
Small payload launch opportunities have been difficult to arrange within the United States, driving many
small payload owners to foreign launch services as their best option. This is in spite of the fact that each year in the
United States thousands of pounds of excess capacity to orbit goes unused. There are several reasons for this that
this paper will address, along with a review of potential options for improving the situation. In addition to these
secondary rideshare opportunities, there are several emerging small launch vehicle offerings that will be capable of
providing dedicated space access for small payloads; these U.S. systems and their associated development status will
also be discussed herein.
Even if the U.S. small payload launch opportunities could be made completely accessible, there would still
likely be more small payloads seeking a launch than the available capacity could satisfy. Various categories of small
payloads will be postulated and the issues and options for acquiring secondary launch opportunities will be
discussed. Safety, integration, and mission assurance implications and options will be discussed in the context of
establishing criteria and guidelines acceptable to the launch services providers, launch service acquirers, and prime
satellite owners.
The third topic of this paper is the operational implications of a proliferation of small satellites on space
track capabilities and space debris in general. The perception of these concerns could impact the ability to acquire a
launch opportunity, where any damage due to collisions have liability implications for the launching state and the
ability to keep an accurate track of small objects in space complicates this matter.
This paper will draw upon the significant insight and ongoing engagement of the launch community by the
authors. In addition, the three described topics will be further addressed through the findings and recommendations
produced by working sessions at the 2015 Small Payload Rideshare Symposium held in June. This paper is intended
to frame these three important topics and stimulate an informed discussion among the small payload rideshare
community and the various government agencies responsible for space policy, launch services, and on-orbit support
operations leading to an increase in viable opportunities.

The goal of achieving routine, affordable
access to space for small satellites involves more issues
than just finding a launch opportunity. It is predicated
on the assumption that the small satellite performs a
useful function and provides meaningful data to a
recognized set of users; it assumes that the small
satellite provider has completed all the necessary
licensing and approval processes; part of these
processes involves addressing the requirement to
dispose of the satellite after its useful lifetime.

INTRODUCTION
This paper summarizes the authors’
perceptions of the small satellite launch status, issues,
concerns, and opportunities based on the presentations,
panels, and side discussions at the 2015 Small Payload
Rideshare Symposium. The paper attempts to frame
and characterize the major issues for continued
discussion and eventual resolution or mitigation.
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In the case of those small satellites that have
no stabilization or propulsion capabilities, it assumes
that the satellite will be placed in an acceptably low
orbit that will ensure that it decays naturally within the
currently defined 25-year period. It assumes that, over
this lifetime, adequate consideration has been given to
the marginal increases in tracking and cataloging efforts
that permit the development of collision warnings and
that the additional risks to other operational satellites
has been determined to be acceptable.

Each of the large U.S. launch vehicle families
(Atlas V, Delta IV, and Falcon 9) is capable of carrying
secondary payloads ranging from CubeSats at the
smallest end of the spectrum through satellites larger
than EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) class
(~200 kg). While excess launch capacity is available
on many of these launches, relatively few of these
missions carry secondary payloads. This session
attempted to drive out the key reasons for this and
explore the steps that would be necessary to better
capitalize on these launch opportunities.

Heretofore, most of these issues received very
little attention beyond the relatively small group of
people directly involved in these activities. However,
recently there have been a number of proposals and
initiatives to launch large constellations of small
satellites, which could affect these issues dramatically.
These proposed constellations could be divided into
two groups, with each group having its own set of
issues and factors.

Since small satellites can either reach orbit as a
secondary satellite on one of these larger launch
vehicles or on a small, dedicated launch vehicle, a
separate panel at the Symposium reviewed the status of
some new small launch vehicles projected to enter the
market in the near term. While this paper will only
summarize the providers represented at the Symposium
there are other small launch vehicles that currently exist
or are in development.

The first group includes proposals by
commercial companies to deploy several thousand
small satellites providing Internet services; it is
assumed that this class of satellite would be in the
higher end of the small satellite range and would likely
have both stabilization and maneuver capabilities. The
second set consists of constellations of hundreds of
CubeSats that might not have maneuver capabilities.

The second question addressed was, “If this
excess capacity could be routinely accessed, how
should this capability be optimized or best used?”
The purpose of this question was to explore
the value of small satellites and the system trades
between satellite size and mission capability; if an
optimum size could be found that would maximize the
mission capabilities of the small satellite that fell within
a range that could more easily be accommodated on
most large launch services, the likelihood of negotiating
routine flight opportunities would be increased.

This dramatic proliferation of small satellites
has already begun to attraction much more attention
from a wider spectrum of government and commercial
organizations. This increased attention could have a
significant effect on the ability to secure routine,
affordable launch services for the entire small satellite
community.

The third question addressed was, “If this
capacity was routinely and efficiently used for small
satellites, what would be the implications for space
traffic management and space debris?”

2015 SMALL PAYLOAD RIDESHARE
SYMPOSIUM

This question has implications for U.S. treaty
obligations, international liabilities, space tracking,
object cataloging, and potential collision warning, risk
evaluations performed by operational satellite users,
and satellite regulation, approval and licensing.

The Small Payload Rideshare Association’s
(SPRSA) 17th annual Small Payload Rideshare
Symposium was hosted by John Hopkins University,
Applied Physics Laboratory on the 9-11th of June this
year [1]. The purpose of these symposia is to provide a
forum for government, industry, and academia to
discuss the issues related to providing routine,
affordable access to space for small payloads. This
year’s program was divided into topical sessions and
attempted to explore some of these issues.

The Symposium sought to identify and frame
the issues discussed in these sessions as a step towards
broader discussions and eventual resolutions or
mitigations. A summary of these sessions will be
presented in this paper in the order listed above.

The first question addressed was, “What
would be required to routinely access the excess
capacity available on large launch vehicles?”
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New Zealand, they can reach inclinations ranging from
45° to sun synchronous.

SMALL LAUNCH VEHICLE OPPORTUNITIES
The most straightforward method for a small
satellite to reach orbit is through the use of its own
launch vehicle. The advantage of this approach is that
the small satellite operator controls the launch schedule
and selects the best orbit possible within the capabilities
of the small launch vehicle selected; the disadvantage is
usually the cost of the launch service.

Firefly Space Systems of Austin Texas was
formed in January of 2014 and plans to test fire their
engine this summer. They are planning the first launch
of their Firefly vehicle in 2017 and expect it to be
capable of placing 400 kg in low earth orbit.
Interorbital Systems, founded in 1996 and
operating from Mojave, California, has been developing
their NEPTUNE orbital system based on their Common
Propulsion Module (CPM) which can be used as a
stand-alone sounding rocket. By clustering these CPMs
as basic building blocks, they plan to provide a series of
scalable orbital systems. Their NEPTUNE 5 consists of
five clustered CPMs and a kick stage.

The use of small, dedicated launch vehicles
within the United States has changed over time with the
progression from all launch systems and services being
under government control to the emergence of
commercial launch systems and services being
available as an adjunct to the government systems.
With the advent of commercial launch services under
the Commercial Space Launch Act, a number of small
satellite launchers emerged in the 1990s. Some of these
were purely commercial developments, while other
developments were either funded by the government or
benefited from some form of government support.

The Boeing Phantom Works Airborne Launch
Assist Space Access (ALASA) project, sponsored by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) consists of a two-stage rocket launched from
an unmodified F-15E. Plans are for 12 launches, 3 with
engineering payloads and 9 demonstration missions.
The goal is to deliver approximately 43 kg to 185 km at
45° inclination for less than $1 million. The first
launch and all 11 subsequent flights are scheduled for
2016.

Some succeeded in becoming operational,
while others disappeared from the marketplace after an
initial failure. In 2000, the Air Force began flying
Minotaur, a decommissioned ballistic missile converted
to a small space launch vehicle, for government
missions.

Super Strypi, while not part of the Symposium
program, was discussed in light of its pending maiden
launch. Super Strypi is a government developed small
launch vehicle managed by the Operationally
Responsive Space Office in Albuquerque.
It is
scheduled for its maiden launch as part of the ORS-4
mission from the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility
on Kauai in October of this year.

Over the years the costs of these small launch
vehicles increased steadily (some by as much as almost
a factor of ten) for a variety of reasons. While the
reasons for the cost increases may have varied from
system to system, the results have been the same; the
costs of these dedicated small systems have moved
beyond what many small satellite operators can afford,
relegating the use of these systems to a diminishing
number of government customers.

These new systems will be demonstrated over
the next few years as they complete their initial
launches. Even if they are not all successful, for the
first time in years there are a number of new options
that offer the promise of reduced costs for the dedicated
launch of small payloads. This sector of the community
appears energized and will hopefully provide new
operational capabilities in the near future.

However, today there is a re-emergence of
small launch vehicles being developed with a goal to
provide launch services in the 2-15 million dollar range.
Private companies are developing some of these, while
others are government-sponsored developments with
hopes of eventual commercial spinoffs. Several of
these systems were discussed at the Rideshare
Symposium and are briefly reviewed here.

SECONDARY PAYLOADS AND EXCESS
LAUNCH CAPACITY

Rocket Labs of New Zealand, founded in
2007, is developing their Electron launch vehicle
capable of placing 100 kg into a 500 km sun
synchronous orbit. Their plan is to launch once a week
with a launch cost of $4.9 million. Their Rutherford
oxygen/hydrocarbon engine has been test fired over 300
times over the last two years the first stage of Electron
is powered by nine of these engines. Launching from
Maultsby
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some amount on both foreign and domestic launch
services providers in their support of both government
and commercial spacecraft.

reach of the general small satellite community. While
the government agencies occasionally use the excess
capacity for their own secondary satellites, this has
been more the exception than the rule.

There are three basic models for excess
margin. In the government model the Government
customers hold all performance margins as part of their
mission assurance options and actively control all
vehicle integration activities. In the first commercial
model commercial customers would consider all launch
vehicle performance capability as theirs and would
view excess capacity as a commodity they could sell to
offset their launch costs. In the second commercial
model, the launch services provider would retain
control of all excess capacity beyond that necessary to
ensure the success of the prime mission.

There are several reasons for the limited
number of government secondary missions; one reason
is simply limited funding; others reasons include the
difficulty of aligning flight opportunities and mission
parameters with the mission requirements of the
secondary payloads. Orbital heights and inclinations
required by the secondary payloads may limit the
number of prime mission that could support them.
Another factor is schedule incompatibilities; secondary
payloads must meet the schedules imposed by the prime
missions. Any failure to meet these key milestone dates
can result in the loss of the flight opportunity.

The first commercial model has not resulted in
many secondary missions on U.S. commercial launches
for a variety of reasons; sometimes the commercial
owners’ view of the value of the excess capacity has not
matched the price the secondary users were willing to
pay.
Other factors, such as mission success
considerations, inadequate funds to merit the perceived
increase in complexity, and the difficulty in matching
their injection parameters with those of available
secondary satellites, have also limited the ability to
conclude agreements.

In addition to finding prime mission partners
willing to accept secondary payloads, the secondary
payload owners face the additional difficulty of
negotiating acceptable launch opportunities: launch
schedules are fixed by the primary spacecraft and its
requisite injection parameters, which may not be
suitable for all small satellite missions.
The advantages of launch opportunities as a
secondary payload on a large prime mission are lower
costs and often greater performance to a wider range of
orbits; under the best of circumstances, the secondary
payloads would only be required to pay the additive or
integration costs and not a pro rata share of the prime
launch vehicle cost. The disadvantages are no control
over launch schedule and limited control over
deployment parameters.

The majority of the U.S. manifest is dedicated
to launching government payloads and the government
customers have traditionally adopted the government
model described earlier assuming the excess capacity
was theirs rather than the launch services providers.
Some government acquirers include contract terms
requiring that all excess margins be allocated to them.
The majority of the launch services providers have not
resisted this approach and have supported their
customers preferences.

All these issues combine to create a difficult
situation. Small satellite builders are reluctant to build
completed spacecraft without a relatively certain
assurance of a launch; once a launch opportunity
presents itself, the small satellite builder may have
limited time to complete his work and meet the required
mission schedules.

This perspective is based on buying the entire
launch vehicle’s capability rather than simply buying a
launch service; the rationale is that they:
•

have paid for the entire vehicle,

•

are responsible for mission success,

•

and that secondary payloads represent a
potentially marginal threat to mission success.

Considering the value and importance of these
national security and civil missions, this is a difficult
position to argue against.

One of the more notable examples of recent
successful secondary flights is the Atlas V Aft
Bulkhead Carrier (ABC); the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) sponsored the first flights of the ABC
designed by ULA and has flown it three times on their
missions. This Atlas-unique secondary adapter is
capable of carrying 85 kg; while it can accommodate a
single small satellite, it has recently been used to mount
a collection of P-PODs for dispensing 28U of
CubeSats.

Nevertheless, this approach has basically
placed excess capacity on these missions beyond the

When a government agency has a requirement
for a secondary launch on a specific mission, it could be
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included in their Request for Proposal when they
initially seek a launch provider; if they have no need for
the excess capacity, there should be a process by which
it could be offered up for responsible use, if there is no
impact to the primary payload or compromise the
security of the mission. The potential small satellites
that could benefit from these opportunities could come
from other agencies within the national security, civil,
and commercial sectors and be built by government,
industry, and academia.

This leaves the launch services provider as a
viable candidate to fill this role. Currently, it is not
clear that the secondary satellite market is robust
enough to make this a self-sustaining commercial
business; many the secondary missions fall more in the
category of a public good than a true market. Often,
these secondary satellites are technology or capability
demonstrators that could ultimately lead to new
missions and new programs. These marginal
investments in future developments may prove to be the
best approach to securing support and funding for new
programs in limited budget environments.

It is highly probable that the best match for a
civil secondary payload might be on a national security
mission; an academic small satellite, designed to
demonstrate a new technology or capability without a
government sponsor, might only be able to meet its
orbital requirements by flying on a commercial mission.
To achieve the most effective and efficient use of
excess capacity across all the U.S. space sectors, a
process would be required that allowed for maximum
access to all U.S. launches independent of the acquirer
or prime mission owner.

If the launch services providers could justify
satisfying this secondary demand in the near term, there
is the possibility that it could develop into a viable
market in the longer term.
For the near term, the U.S. launch manifest
will continue to be dominated by government missions.
Without some change, the excess capacity on these
missions will likely remain largely unavailable for
secondary rideshares other than a few CubeSats and
select government small satellites. Other U.S. small
secondary satellites will most probably continue to seek
launch opportunities with foreign providers.

This is a challenging goal and could only be
achieved through the cooperation of all the U.S. space
sectors.
Mission success/mission assurance concerns
are real and government agencies should always have
the right to review the integration of secondary
payloads on their launch vehicles. The most the small
payload community should expect is a balanced
position that recognizes valid mission assurance
concerns while offering up as much excess capacity as
could be prudently made available.

Government and industry are at a crossroads
as to how to actively manage the question of excess
launch capacity. The government agencies are, and
should be, conservative in ensuring a high probability
of mission success and low risk in providing launch
services for the nation’s most valuable and critical
space missions. Excess performance margin, of itself,
can be a component of assuring mission success by
simply providing additional margin to mitigate
unforeseen circumstances.

Key issues to routinely accessing excess
capacity on these classes of missions include:
•

Who should manage the excess capacity?

•

Who should identify appropriate secondary
payload candidates?

•

Who should select, plan, and integrate these
secondary missions?

But how much margin is really needed? At
what point does additional margin begin to be more of a
waste of capability than a useful hedge against
uncertainty? Government and industry should work
together to clearly understand the answers to these
trades. As the government begins to acquire launch
services more competitively, it will be even more
important that the proposals and contracts are clearly
written and specify what capacity is required and who
would be best positioned to manage any excess capacity
while assuring mission success.

The individual government agencies responsible
for either the prime spacecraft or the launch service
may not be inclined to spend their limited appropriated
funds for these purpose; they could more easily justify
spending appropriated funds for mission assurance
reviews to ensure that the inclusion of a secondary on
their prime mission would not pose an increased risk to
their mission success.

Maultsby
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stabilization
altogether.

OPTIMIZING AVAILABLE EXCESS LAUNCH
CAPACITY

propulsion,

may

be

dropped

Several studies have been done to attempt to
define that “sweet spot” where maximum mission
capability is achieved at minimum weight and volume.
The tentative conclusion seems to be that a useful size
would be a standard secondary adapter capable of
carrying about 90-100 kg or half an ESPA class
payload.

Once a solution has been found as to how to
provide efficient access to this available capacity, the
next task would be to establish an appropriate level of
performance capability that could be made routinely
available. Setting this value too high would limit the
number of flight opportunities and setting it too low
would waste available performance. It should be an
amount available on the majority of all prime mission
launches; it should be an acceptable amount to the
prime spacecraft operators who pay for the prime
launch service, the launch services acquirers who are
responsible for launch mission assurance, and the
launch services providers whose market share in a
competitive environment depends on sustained mission
success.

These adapters should be able to accommodate
a single small satellite or serve as a mount for a
collection of P-PODs. This approach would provide
both standardization from an integration perspective
and flexibility in payload selection and operations; this
flexibility would offer the small satellite community the
best chance for routine secondary launch opportunities.
The Atlas V Aft Bulkhead Carrier (ABC) is an example
of just such an adapter – capable of mounting an 85 kg
small satellite or a collection of P-PODs uniquely to the
Centaur stage. This type of flexibility in the range of
payload accommodations is an excellent model for
maximizing efficient use of excess capacity.

A key enabler for the CubeSat community was
the standard P-POD dispenser. The small satellite
community needs a similar standard. Assuming that the
excess capacity on U.S. launch vehicles could somehow
be made available, what size payload capability would
be optimum? Seeking too large a capacity would limit
the number of times it would be flown; settling for too
small a capability would limit the value of the flight
opportunity.

Ideally, two standard adapters in this size
range could be made available on essentially every
flight with adequate margins. With each capable of
carrying about 90 kg, the total secondary capability
routinely available would be around 180 kg; this seems
like a realistic goal for a routine secondary
accommodations that could be available on most U.S.
large launch vehicles. This approach would seem to
offer the best compromise between the maximum
weight likely to be available and acceptable on most
U.S. prime launches and a capability to provide flexible
launch opportunities for a variety of highly capable and
useful small satellites.

Clearly, an EELV Secondary Payload Adapter
(ESPA) ring defines the high end of the small satellite
adapters and is so capable that it will likely be flown
infrequently since few missions would have this much
excess capacity available; however, it has de facto
established a “standard” spacecraft size, i.e. an ESPAclass payload of a given volume and 200 kg weight.
P-PODs, in any quantity, would still be limited
to deploying CubeSats and would not be of use to other
small satellites.

Routine flight opportunities with limited
available weight appear to be more valuable than
aperiodic opportunities with large available weight.
Routine flight opportunities would allow small satellites
to drop out of the flight queue and others in waiting to
move into their space. To achieve this degree of
flexibility, the standards and requirements would have
to be comprehensive enough the permit early
certification and flight approval. Essentially, the queue
of small satellites waiting for launch would have to be
transparent to the launch vehicle and the prime
missions.

For the purposes of this discussion, the
reference to a standard size secondary adapter should be
viewed as a description of a capability rather than a
point hardware design. Once a “standard” size and
weight has been chosen, there may be a need for several
secondary adapters that would accommodate this
standard, each able to interface with a variety of launch
vehicles.
All spacecraft components can be divided into
two general categories – bus services and mission
equipment. As spacecraft get smaller the bus services
begin to account for a higher percentage of the
available weight and volume. At some point, as is the
case with CubeSats, some bus services, such as
Maultsby
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If secondary payloads are to be affordably and
easily integrated onto large launch vehicles, the
interfaces need to be minimal. If more than one small
satellite is involved, sequencers could be used rather
than individual interface commands from the launch
vehicle; designs for these types of secondary
sequencers already exist.

higher altitudes to increase ground coverage and user
access.
There are drag enhancement options and small
de-orbit propulsion options available for consideration
by small satellite operators.
They represent an
additional complexity and expense that can create a
conflict between responsible environmental behavior
and sound economic business cases. Most drag
enhancement devices actually increase the object’s
cross section and marginally increase the short-term
collision risk, while seeking to meet disposal guidelines
that are intended to decrease the long-term risks.

Typically, secondary payloads are not
deployed until after the deployment of the primary
spacecraft to reduce risks to the prime mission. A
general set of conditions that if met by the secondary
spacecraft, would facilitate acceptance by both the
prime spacecraft and the launch service acquirer and
provider.

One of the key observations pointed out in the
debris session at the Rideshare Symposium was that
potential collisions scale with quantity more than size.
Potential collision calculations assume a volume around
each object that is typically much greater than its actual
size – usually kilometers. Therefore the estimates are
not as sensitive to the actual spacecraft size – one tenth
of a cubic meter or ten cubic meters – as they are to the
number of possible objects that could be involved in a
collision. Other spacecraft seeking to avoid a collision
react to this larger conjunction area.
This has
significant implications for large CubeSat constellations
with no maneuver capabilities.

SMALL SATELLITES & SPACE DEBRIS
Space debris is defined as any man-made
object in space that is not serving a useful purpose.
These are typically dead satellites, rocket bodies, parts
or pieces from deployments, explosions, or collisions.
The space surveillance system attempts to track all
objects in space, and for those that can be tracked
consistently enough to establish an orbit, enter them
into a catalog. The smaller the object, the more difficult
it is to track and, unfortunately, the majority of the
potentially lethal space debris is currently beyond our
ability to effectively track.

The regulatory environment for commercial
space is currently not straightforward. The Department
of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Authority
(DoT/FAA) has authority for licensing commercial
launch sites, launches, and re-entry. The Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) and the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
regulate radio frequencies. The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulates remote
earth sensing.

Just as air traffic control works to avoid
collisions among aircraft, space traffic control would
have the objective to avoid collisions among space
objects. Spacecraft are less maneuverable than aircraft
and the implications of movement are more
pronounced. Spacecraft flight paths are fixed by
Kepler’s laws and the results of a propulsive maneuver
are limited, while consuming a finite propellant
resource. Some satellites don’t have a capability to
maneuver while they are active, much less after their
useful lifetimes.

The efforts of these U.S. agencies are
conducted through a lengthy process of rulemaking that
must include a cost-benefit analysis. The result is a
complicated process for obtaining licenses to launch
and operate a system from the commercial operator’s
perspective, and difficulty in enforcing debris
mitigation compliance from the government’s
perspective.

CubeSats, as an example, typically have short
lifetimes and no maneuver or disposal capability.
Space debris mitigation guidelines specify that objects
will either reenter within 25 years after the end of the
mission, or will be moved sufficiently far from useful
orbits that they will not pose a risk of collision.
CubeSats have usually met the 25 year decay rule by
flying in low orbits, roughly under 600 km. Satellites
under this altitude generally decay naturally within 25
years.

There are growing concerns from the operators
of existing space systems about the potential
operational impact of new, large constellations of small
satellites, which could provide a stimulus for revised or
increased regulations. The industry as a whole can
expect continued debate and a growing call for
regulation, active space traffic management, or both.

But this limits the launch options to those
missions that could provide secondary deployments to
this insertion threshold, where many LEO
constellations—notably for communications—prefer
Maultsby
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The U.S. is a signatory to international treaties
that hold the launching state liable for damages incurred
from objects it places in space. To date, there have
been so few collisions that case law has not been
developed. The international perception is that the U.S.
seems to be lagging behind the international community
in their concern for the growing amount of space debris
and its potential for damage.

space debris. Furthermore, without a cohesive plan
inclusive of the commercial and government markets,
the ability to ensure a safe orbit for all satellites will
decrease over the next decade as thousands of small
satellites, including CubeSats, enter orbit.
If the government is to provide these services
to an increasing number of users, the costs to provide
the information will likely increase. The options for
funding this activity will need to be addressed and
could range from pure government funding all the way
to taxes on commercial operators to offset the
government’s costs.

There is a clear environmental concern that
should, and likely will be, recognized as the number of
nations operating spacecraft increases and the
implications of collisions, damage, and the subsequent
creation of additional debris becomes more apparent.
All objects in space represent a potential threat to all
other objects in space.

Space operators are expending more resources
evaluating the potential encounters and possible
collisions between their active satellites and other space
objects. This is necessary to determine whether or not
there is sufficient risk to warrant a risk avoidance
maneuver. Typically, these types of maneuvers may
only be rarely implemented, but the resources to reach
the determination are not trivial and are likely to
become even more costly and difficult as the number of
objects increase.

Tracking the total number of objects in space
will become more challenging and expensive as the
number of objects increases. Tracking and cataloging
is necessary to know which objects are which, who is
responsible for them, and whether or not they can
maneuver.
The ability to maneuver has both a positive
and a negative aspect. Maneuver allows for options to
avoid collisions and de-orbit; maneuver also
complicates tracking since, after a maneuvering, a
cataloged object will not appear as expected and will
require some time to correlate data and re-establish a
cataloged track. Satellite users currently do not
necessarily publish or otherwise notify anyone of their
maneuvers before execution or in near real time after
the fact.

These analyses to evaluate the need or benefits
of maneuvering a spacecraft take time and money even
if decision is to do nothing. All maneuvers have
implications for operations, satellite resource
management, and ultimately satellite lifetime
considerations. Every new space system has a potential
impact on other satellite operators, but this is often not
considered in system design. Large-scale constellations
of small satellites may have a significant impact on
other satellites operations.

After a spacecraft has maneuvered and before
a new track has been established, there is a period of
time when all collision encounter analyses are invalid; a
given maneuver may actually have placed the satellite
into a potential collision encounter that was not
recognized. The ability of the tracking systems and
operators to communicate potential threats to operators
may not be adequate to allow for considered maneuver
options. Our space surveillance networks have the
responsibility to track, catalog, and provide warning for
potential dangers. Commercial space operators may
soon account for a much larger portion of the objects
that must be tracked.

The need for some type of space traffic
management will only increase with time; the growing
number of objects in space represents a significant
environmental problem with international implications
and consequences. The need for a risk/benefit analysis
may soon become an integral part of the decision to
deploy any satellite; this could be a concern for the
deployment of constellations involving numerous small
satellites, especially if they have no provision for
maneuver or de-orbit.
Small satellite operators can be seen as
responsible members of the international space
community by voluntary and overt compliance with
space debris mitigation guidelines and best practices.

Their interest timely tracking and warning
information has led to the creation of commercial space
track services specifically tailored to these needs.

SUMMARY
The ability to efficiently track and catalogue
all objects in space is a critical requirement whose
importance will only increase with the projected growth
in the number of satellites in orbit and the amount of
Maultsby
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to only a small user community while others may offer
significant public good.

The only established processes for accessing
secondary flight opportunities on these government
missions primarily address government small satellites.
Current practices limit the launch services providers
from making excess capacity available to general users.

Space is a finite shared resource and all objects
placed in space have potentially profound implications
for all other objects. In this environment, the value of
the individual small satellite and the usefulness of the
mission data it provides will likely become a more
critical part of any risk/benefit analysis.

The launch services providers have few
incentives and no clear business case to provide
secondary payload services, even if their government
customers were to allow it.

How should the value of a satellite or a spacebased capability be evaluated and judged? Who should
make the judgment? Since the launching state is
ultimately responsible for damages, should each
launching state make the determination as to whether
the benefits of a specific satellite or capability outweigh
the risks? Is the ability to place an object in orbit
sufficient justification for permitting it?

Space
traffic
management
and
the
management of space debris are attracting increased
attention at the international level. These issues will
only become more important as the number of satellites
increase.
In this environment, the value of the individual
satellites and the data they provide will become a
critical aspect of obtaining launch and operational
approvals and licenses.

All U.S. sectors are involved with satellites –
national security, civil, and commercial. No single
government agency is responsible for behavior of all
three sectors. The increasing number of small satellites
and the plans to launch hundreds, if not thousands, of
small satellites in the future are outpacing the
government’s formulation of policy and the creation of
regulations to ensure safe orbital operations for all
space users. This is a national issue with international
ramifications that will undoubtedly receive increased
attention in the near term.

The ability to maneuver out of harm’s way and
to dispose of satellites at the end of their lifetime may
become a non-negotiable requirement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Government, industry, and academia need
work together to develop acceptable and efficient ways
of accessing and maximizing the use of excess launch
capacity for high value secondary missions if the U.S.
is to capitalize on this unexploited asset.

OBSERVATIONS
The availability of small, dedicated launch
services seems to be increasing. While these new
systems have not yet launched, there are enough
initiatives underway to justify the optimism that some
of these new systems will mature into an affordable and
operational capability in the near future.

The small satellite community should develop
a classification for various small satellite categories and
the needs and conditions pertinent to each; this could
help facilitate the discussions about the value of
utilizing the excess launch capacity and the terms,
conditions, and processes necessary to make it efficient.

Secondary payload launches from large launch
services deploying prime payloads are more
problematic. Foreign and some limited commercial
launches appear to offer an impressive increase in
secondary payload launch opportunities; foreign launch
services will likely remain and attractive and viable
option for many U.S. secondary payload missions.

The small satellite community needs to
develop a standard set of requirements that, when met,
would ensure minimal-to-no risks to prime mission
success.
The community needs to define a standard
secondary size and interfaces that would facilitate
routine secondary flight opportunities; this should be a
limited practical size that could be flown frequently.
Currently this appears to be about 90 kg (half ESPA
size), which would match the “sweet spot” identified
for maximizing mission capabilities in small satellites.
This would provide for a spectrum of secondary launch
standards – CubeSats/P-PODs, half ESPA size, and
ESPA size. For secondary spacecraft lager than ESPA
size, there would still be the option of internal payload

Secondary payloads on government missions
still represent a significant challenge. The government
prime spacecraft owners and the government launch
services acquirers typically have little problem flying
government sponsored secondary spacecraft; flying
secondary payloads that do not directly support specific
agency mission areas are more problematic.

Maultsby
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carriers where ESPA rings or an A-Deck ring could be
stacked to provide for mounting the larger payloads
inside these adapters.
As the issues of space debris, space tracking
capabilities and responsibilities, and international space
traffic management are sorted out at the governmental
levels, the small spacecraft community should actively
consider their contributions to these problems and
voluntarily adopt an environmentally responsible
approach in their plans and operations.

REFERENCES
1.

Final program and presentations at the 17th
Annual Small Payload Rideshare Symposium:
https://www.sprsa.org/17th-annual-smallpayload-rideshare-symposium/program.

Maultsby

10

29th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

